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Abstract
After controversial public debates, fuel price regulations were implemented
in Austria prohibiting fuel retailers from raising their prices more than once per
day. This paper investigates whether these policy measures affected the price
transmission dynamics from crude oil prices to retail fuel prices. We estimate
different specifications of nonlinear error correction models to quantify a po-
tentially asymmetric adjustment behaviour and compare the results over three
subsamples. Particularly, we estimate our models for a pre-regulation period,
a between-regulations and a post-regulation period. At first glance, we obtain
conflicting results on the efficacy of this policy measure. While the adjustment
to the long-run equilibrium seems to be faster if crude oil prices are relatively
low, transitory crude oil price decreases are passed through faster than price in-
creases. Only if we consider the combined effect of a crude oil price shock, we can
reveal that crude oil price changes are generally passed through faster in the post-
regulation period. Further, we find that crude oil price decreases are now passed
through slightly faster than crude oil price increases. Hence, we conclude that
the Austrian fuel price regulation seems to have fostered competition between
fuel retailers.
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1 Introduction
Road transportation is the predominant transportation mode in OECD countries and
relies almost completely on oil. This leaves no doubt that fuel prices are of particular
interest for consumers, regulatory authorities and policy-makers in general. Regulatory
authorities are concerned with the question whether large oil companies exercise their
market power to charge consumers with higher prices than necessary. One particular
issue that is discussed in the public and political debate is the presumption that oil com-
panies delay input price decreases but pass through input price increases to the retail
market immediately. This behaviour is generally known as asymmetric price transmis-
sion (APT). From the perspective of standard economic theory such asymmetric price
transmissions lead to consumer welfare losses which should be avoided. Consequently,
asymmetric fuel pricing has attracted a lot of attention in the economic literature. Sev-
eral empirical studies have been conducted in the last three decades to evaluate the
fuel price transmission in different countries with mixed results (see, for example, Ba-
con (1991); Manning (1991); Kirchgässner and Kübler (1992); Galeotti et al. (2003);
Grasso and Manera (2007); Balaguer and Ripollés (2012); Asane-Otoo and Schneider
(2015); Schweikert (2017)). A recent meta-analysis by Perdiguero (2013) found that,
among others, the segment of the industry analyzed, different research designs and the
time span of the analysis might explain the heterogeneity in results. Also, the level of
competition seems to be a key factor for the existence of asymmetries in a specific fuel
market.
In this paper, we focus on vertical price transmission along the fuel distribution
chain. Vertical APT can be classified into short-run APT and long-run APT accord-
ing to Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel (2004). Short-run APT describes the asymmetric
effects of positive or negative input price changes on output prices. Hence, the pass
through depends on the sign and magnitude of the price change. In contrast, long-run
APT evaluates reaction times, length of fluctuations and the speed of adjustment to-
wards a long-run equilibrium between input and output prices. Consequently, long-run
APT leads to a temporary transfer until the prices have adjusted to a new equilibrium
state. Short-run APT, on the other hand, leads to a permanent transfer consider-
ing that prices are integrated and shocks have a persistent effect. A combination of
short-run and long-run APT is possible and in empirical cases it usually cannot be de-
termined a priori which type of asymmetry is stronger. Further, we distinguish between
positive and negative APT. Positive (negative) asymmetry implies that output prices
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tend to respond faster to an increase (a decrease) in input prices than to a decrease
(an increase). However, these terms have an opposite normative interpretation. From
the perspective of the consumer, positive asymmetry constitutes a welfare loss while
negative asymmetry constitutes a welfare gain. Positive APT has also been referred to
as the ‘rockets and feathers’ phenomenon since it implies that prices rise like rockets
but fall like feathers.1
A considerable amount of literature has emerged raising explanations for the exis-
tence of asymmetric pricing behaviour (see, among others, Johnson (2002), Verlinda
(2008), Deltas (2008) and Lewis and Noel (2011)). One of the primary causes could
be the exploitation of market power by large oil companies in non-competitive market
structures. Fuel markets are often highly concentrated and show different features of
oligopolistic markets. Balke et al. (1998) consider oligopolistic firms that engage in tacit
collusion. If the input prices increase in such a market, the colluding firms will adjust
their prices upwards in order to signal their competitors that they stick to their collusive
agreements. In contrast, if input prices decrease, firms will adjust their prices slowly
to avoid signalling to their competitors that they are not retaining the tacit collusion
equilibrium. The old retail price also offers a natural focal point for oligopolistic sellers
so that high prices can be maintained in the short run. Following the tacit collusion or
focal point hypotheses, we would expect to find evidence for positive APT in our retail
fuel price data.
Another cause for asymmetric pricing is known as the search cost hypothesis (John-
son, 2002). It implies that consumers have a stronger incentive to search for lower
prices during periods of increasing prices while their incentive to search is inhibited in
periods of falling prices. When wholesale prices increase and the retail filling station
decides to adjust its prices, consumers are motivated to search for a better price. In
contrast, falling wholesale prices lead to a lower search intensity of consumers. Con-
sequently, retailers have an incentive to delay input price increases to maintain their
market share. Following the search cost hypothesis, we would expect to find evidence
for negative APT in our retail fuel price data. Also, retailers generally pass through
price decreases faster in markets where search costs are low. Menu costs (Ball and
Mankiw, 1994) and inventory adjustment (Borenstein and Shepard, 2002) are added as
further explanations for positive APT.
The existence of asymmetric pricing in a fuel market has substantial consumer
1The name originates from the Bacon (1991) paper entitled: ‘Rockets and feathers: the asymmetric
speed of adjustment of UK retail gasoline prices to cost changes’
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welfare implications since under positive APT consumers do not benefit from price re-
ductions in the same extent as they would under symmetric adjustment. This welfare
misallocation could be resolved by appropriate policy measures. Several regulatory
measures to fight collusive behaviour have been implemented, for example, in parts of
Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg and parts of Canada. Recently, a fuel price regula-
tion was established in Austria which prohibited retail filling stations to increase prices
more than once per day. The measure is expected to increase price transparency for
consumers by limiting the number of price changes per day and intends to foster com-
petition. However, the real effects of the proposed policy measures are unclear a priori
and have to be evaluated empirically.
This paper investigates the price transmission from crude oil to retail fuel prices in
Austria using nonlinear error correction models. In particular, we investigate the pass
through of Brent spot price changes to retail gasoline and diesel prices excluding tax
and duty. For that matter, we use daily observations obtained for a sample ranging
from August 2004 to March 2016. The main focus of this study lies in the evaluation
of two fuel price regulations introduced in July 2009 and January 2011 in Austria and
their effects on the price adjustment dynamics. While the price regulation in July
2009 limited the retailers to one price increase per day at a time depending on the
type of retail filling station, the second price regulation standardized the procedure
and restricted all retailers to increase their prices at noon. However, retailers were still
allowed to decrease prices at any time.
The effects of this policy on the fuel price transmission might be twofold. On the
one hand, fixing a date for price increases could have brought greater price transparency
which might have lowered the search costs for consumers. Consequently, it would be
easier for consumers to select the retail filling station with the best prices and in turn
it would be more difficult for oil companies to delay price decreases. On the other
hand, it could be easier for oil companies to maintain a tacit collusion equilibrium
since they would only have to coordinate a daily maximum price and the subsequent
(potential) price decreases. Moreover, it can be expected that firms anticipate that
they will not have the possibility to increase their prices and might charge higher initial
prices (Obradovits, 2014). The retailers might lower this initial price level in smaller
steps throughout the day which would in turn appear as positive short-run APT. We
evaluate the efficacy of the Austrian fuel price regulation by comparing the findings
on short-run and long-run asymmetry for subsamples comprising of observations before
and after the introduction of both regulations.
4
Our main contributions to the discussion about asymmetric price transmission are
the following: First, whereas the majority of studies on asymmetric pricing transmission
provide empirical evidence for one or more countries over a specific period of time,
we investigate whether the fuel price adjustment dynamics have changed after the
introduction of a specific policy measure regulating the retail fuel market. This could
be relevant for policy makers intending to implement similar policy measures.2 Second,
to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first study to analyze the Austrian retail
fuel market in terms of asymmetric pricing behaviour using data obtained after the
second fuel price regulation was implemented in 2011. The Austrian federal competition
authority (BWB) conducted studies in order to test for asymmetries in the Austrian
fuel market with mixed results using data until 2012 but did not evaluate a sufficiently
long period to study any long-term effects. Third, we use daily data instead of weekly
or monthly data to account for the generally fast adjustment of fuel prices to crude oil
price changes which has been reported in previous studies (see, for example, Bachmeier
and Griffin (2003), Balaguer and Ripollés (2012) and Perdiguero (2013)). Thereby, we
can reveal asymmetries which would be invisible in aggregated data.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 compares the
Austrian fuel price regulation to other regulatory measures found in Australia and
Canada. Section 3 contains a review of relevant empirical literature and discusses the
economic implications of price regulation policies. Section 4 outlines the methodology
used to model potentially asymmetric price transmissions. In Section 5, we apply these
techniques to Austrian fuel price data and Section 6 offers a conclusion.
2 A comparison of different fuel price regulations
According to the IEA (2014), the Austrian fuel market is one of the most regulated
in the European Union. The current price regulations were implemented in two steps.
The first regulation, Austrian Fuel Price Fixing Act (‘Spritpreisverordnung’) introduced
in 2009, restricted retail filling stations to increase prices only once per day. The
2The discussion on fuel price regulations is prevalent in many European countries, e.g. Ger-
many (Die Welt: ‘Regulierung macht das Tanken nur noch teurer’ on March 03, 2012) and the UK
(Bloomberg: ‘Price caps are the wrong solution for UK energy’ on October 18, 2017). While the
competition authority in Germany (Bundeskartellamt) has advised against Austrian-type fuel price
regulations (Bundeskartellamt, 2011), the issue is still regularly brought up in public debates. In 2013,
the Market Transparency Unit for fuels was established to provide consumers with information about
current fuel prices in Germany.
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designated time for price increases in case of 24-hour stations was midnight, while
self-service stations were allowed to increase prices at 8:30 and stations with regular
opening hours could increase prices at the opening hour. Disregarding the regulation
led to a 2,000 Euro fine. Price decreases were allowed at any time and without limit.
In 2011, the regulation was tightened and all retail filling stations in Austria were only
allowed to increase their prices at noon (BWB 2009). Additionally, in July 2011 a
law on transparency of prices (‘Preistransparenzverordnung Treibstoffpreise 2011’) was
approved committing all retail filling stations to send their price changes within 30
minutes to E-Control, the Austrian Energy Regulator, which makes the prices available
to drivers via a free internet tool (OECD, 2013).
Similar fuel price regulations have been implemented in different countries during
the last decade. Starting in 20013, Western Australia imposed a regulatory measure
restricting the fuel price for 24 hour intervals. Retailers have to submit the next day’s
fuel prices by 14:00 to the state government and are obliged to follow the notified price
from 6:00 for the next 24 hours. The major difference to the Austrian-type regulation is
that neither increases nor decreases are allowed in Western Australia. The fuel prices of
each day and the following day are posted on the official FuelWatch web page. This form
of fuel price regulation reduces daily price volatility by construction but the regulatory
authorities intent to provide transparency and reduce consumer search costs as well
(Byrne, 2014).
Most Canadian provinces and territories have regulated and deregulated their fuel
markets at some point in time. Currently, five of thirteen provinces and territories are
regulating their fuel prices. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick enacted the Petroleum
Product Pricing Act in July 2006 defining so-called price ceilings or caps, but this policy
measure differs between provinces. In Novia Scotia, it sets minimum and maximum
prices for each week (before 2009 the prices were set for the following two weeks).
The designated fuel prices at the pump are determined from the benchmark spot fuel
price (New York Harbor Spot), applicable taxes, wholesale and retail margins and
transportation cost. Wholesale prices are set 6 cents per litre above the benchmark
price, the markup for transportation cost varies between 0.2 - 2.0 cents per litre and the
profit margin is determined to be between 4.0 - 5.5 cents per litre. In New Brunswick,
only the maximum price is set by the regulatory authority (Suvankulov et al., 2012).
Luxembourg maintains a similar price ceiling mechanism.
3Petroleum Products Pricing Regulations 2000 extending the Petroleum Products Pricing Act
1983.
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Several studies are concerned with the economic implications of fuel price regu-
lations: Berninghaus et al. (2012) use a game theoretical lab experiment to test the
hypothesis that companies would set higher prices under conditions defined by the
Austrian-type fuel price regulation. Their results show that prices in the regulated
market are indeed at a higher level than in the non-regulated market. In particular
76% of the participants chose the highest prices in the non-regulated market whereas
91% chose the highest prices in the regulated market. Consequently, the hypothesis of
higher prices under the Austrian fuel price regulation seems to hold in this specific lab
experiment. The authors also measure the price volatility in both synthetic markets
which turns out to be lower in the regulated market.
Obradovits (2014) conducts a theoretical analysis in a two-period duopoly model
with consumer search and finds that the Austrian-type fuel price regulation has detri-
mental effects on consumer welfare. Retailers intertemporally distort prices in a way
so that their profits remain unchanged compared to the unregulated market. This
behaviour is in line with the results obtained by Berninghaus et al. (2012). A delay
of purchases would be beneficial for consumers, but most consumers are not flexible
enough in their purchasing time and experience a welfare loss.
In a further lab experiment, Haucap and Müller (2012) investigate the effects of
three different fuel price regulations (Luxembourg, Western Australia, Austria). The
results suggest that the Austrian-type and the Luxembourg-type regulation decrease
consumer welfare while the Western Australian regulation does not. In addition, none
of them lowers retail prices.
3 Literature Review
Although an extensive empirical literature on asymmetric fuel pricing exists, only a few
studies can be found that analyze asymmetric behaviour in connection with fuel price
regulations. This can in parts be explained by the small number of developed countries
with regulated fuel markets. Therefore, the focus in this section is on studies related
to fuel price regulations in the countries mentioned above and on studies specifically
investigating asymmetric pricing in the Austrian retail fuel market.
The BWB conducts studies on the Austrian fuel market since 2004, motivated by
a public concern that asymmetric pricing could harm consumer welfare (OECD, 2013).
They conducted two studies in 2008 and 2010 in order to estimate a possible asymmetric
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behaviour in response to wholesale prices using an EGARCH error correction model.
Daily data were obtained from the Austrian Automobile, Motorcycle and Touring Club
(ÖAMTC) for the period September 2003 to March 2008. The result of the first study
suggest that gasoline price increases were passed through on the first or second day
while price decreases where passed through on the fourth day. A similar pattern could
be observed for diesel prices with pass through durations of one day and three days,
respectively (BWB 2008). In 2010, the BWB conducted another study to ascertain
whether the results were still valid after the implementation of the first Fuel Price
Fixing Act. They split their full sample from 2004 to 2010 into two subsample periods.
For the first period, from September 2004 to November 2007 they found similar evidence
as in the previous study. For the second period, from November 2007 to February 2010,
no evidence for asymmetry could be found (OECD, 2013).
Apart from the official investigations by the BWB, only few studies specifically focus
on the Austrian retail fuel market. Meyler (2009) analyzes the pass through of oil prices
into consumer liquid prices, including gasoline, diesel and heating fuel oil, for the euro
area using a bivariate error correction model. For the case of Austria, the author does
not identify significant asymmetries in pass through. 50% of a wholesale price shock
to the gasoline market is adjusted in approximately three weeks. Wlazlowski et al.
(2009) consider single country and cross-country asymmetries in the euro area. They
report some evidence of cross-country effects for Austria but cannot find any vertical
asymmetry. Similarly, Arpa et al. (2006) cannot detect asymmetric price reactions to
changes in oil prices. However, the adjustment speed of the Austrian fuel market seems
to be among the lowest in the euro area.
Remarkably, the latter three studies do not find asymmetries in Austria whereas
the first study of the BWB does. One explanation for the conflicting results could be
the frequency of the data employed by the specific studies. The latter three studies use
weekly data instead of daily data. It would not be surprising that the price adjustment
appears to be symmetric when data is sampled weekly but the true speed of adjustment
could only be measured at a daily frequency. The speed of pass through estimated by
the BWB is completed within three days. Therefore, one could imagine that possible
asymmetries are smoothed out in weekly intervals. In this context, Meyler (2009)
cautions against the use of low frequency data for the analysis of potentially asymmetric
price transmissions and suggest to use a weekly frequency at the minimum.
Dewenter and Heimeshoff (2012) analyze the effects of the first Austrian fuel price
regulation in 2009 on the price levels using a difference-in-differences method and weekly
8
data from 2005 to 2012. They find empirical evidence for a negative price effect of the
regulation which implies that fuel price levels decreased after the implementation. In
this regard, the policy measure seems to meet the positive expectations of the regulatory
authorities. Concerning the Western Australian regulation, Dewenter and Heimeshoff
(2012) find no statistically significant effects of the regulation on price levels. Con-
sequently, the regulation reduces the price volatility but does not necessarily foster
competition.
Wang (2009) investigates the dynamic pricing strategies in fuel markets before and
after the implementation of price regulations. Empirical evidence is found that retailers
in Western Australia have engaged in tacit pricing coordination. Also, the price regu-
lation reduced the price levels only for the first four month after the implementation
but did not significantly lower average prices in the long-run. This might imply some
learning effects of fuel retailers who had to adjust to a new market structure.
Suvankulov et al. (2012) focus on the price regulations and price convergences of
retail fuel markets in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. For this purpose, they study
the pricing behaviour of retailers in 60 Canadian cities which include 6 cities from Nova
Scotia and 9 cities from New Brunswick using a monthly dataset from January 2000 to
October 2010. They find conflicting results for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Since
the regulation was implemented in 2006, the prices of the 9 cities in New Brunswick
converged to the national mean and the volatility reduced significantly. In contrast,
there is no significant convergence in Nova Scotia with increased volatility and overall
higher price levels. Sen et al. (2011) also investigate the price regulations implemented
in Atlantic Canadian provinces and report that prices in the post-regulation period are
generally higher.
4 Empirical Methodology
In the empirical analysis of the fuel price data, we study both short-run and long-run
asymmetry. Asymmetric adjustment to a long-run equilibrium can only be modelled
in a meaningful way if input and output prices are cointegrated. Since the long-run
relationship is not exactly known, we estimate the linear cointegrating regression
yt = β0 + β1 xt + ut, (1)
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where yt is the output price, xt is the input price and ut is the disturbance term that
may be serially correlated. We assume that both prices are integrated of order one.
The variables are cointegrated if the deviations from the long-run equilibrium, ut, are
only temporary. Following the two-step procedure developed by Engle and Granger
(1987), we use an auxilliary ADF regression to test if the cointegration residuals are
stationary,
∆zt = % zt−1 +
k∑
j=1
γj ∆zt−j + εt. (2)
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is given by % = 0 while the alternative is given by
−2 < % < 0. Alternatively, we use a cointegration test described in Enders and Siklos
(2001) which accounts for asymmetries in the form of threshold adjustment. After
confirming the existence of a cointegration relationship, we can use the cointegrating
residuals to specify an asymmetric error correction model (AECM). Similar to Granger
and Lee (1989) and Grasso and Manera (2007), we express the change in the output
price as
∆yt = α+ uˆ+t−1 + α− uˆ−t−1 +
p∑
i=0
(
γ+i ∆x+t−i + γ−i ∆x−t−i
)
+
q∑
i=1
δi ∆yt−i + εt, (3)
where uˆ+t is equal to uˆt if uˆt > 0 and to zero if uˆt < 0. Correspondingly, uˆ−t is equal
to uˆt if uˆt < 0 and to zero if uˆt > 0. The coefficients α+ and α− measure the speed
of adjustment of the output price after positive or negative deviations from the long-
run equilibrium, respectively. Consumer welfare losses due to long-run asymmetry are
found if α+ > α−. The null hypothesis of symmetric long-run adjustment,
H01 : α+ = α−, (4)
can be tested using an F -statistic (FLR).
Short-run asymmetries are captured by decomposing the first differences into ∆x+t−i
if ∆xt−i > 0 and ∆x−t−i if ∆xt−i < 0. We investigate the short-run impact of input
price changes through three different channels. First, we test whether the short-run
transmission is symmetric at any lag. The null hypothesis is given by
H02 : γ+1 = γ−1 ∧ γ+2 = γ−2 ∧ · · · ∧ γ+p = γ−p . (5)
and tested using an F -statistic which is denoted by FSR. Second, we test for equality
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of the cumulated effects. We denote the F -statistic computed for the null hypothesis
of symmetric cumulated effects,
H03 :
p∑
i=1
γ+i =
p∑
i=1
γ−i , (6)
as FCE. Finally, we test whether positive and negative input price shocks are transmit-
ted fully. The null hypothesis is given by
H04a :
p∑
i=1
γ+i = 1, (7)
for input price increases and
H04b :
p∑
i=1
γ−i = 1, (8)
for input price decreases. The corresponding F -statistics are denoted by FFA+ and
FFA− , respectively.
Additionally, we generalize the AECM and decompose the error correction term
uˆt using an optimally chosen threshold value. The threshold error correction model
(TECM) takes the form of
∆yt = α1 It uˆt−1 + α2 (1− It) uˆt−1 +
p∑
i=0
(
γ+i ∆x+t−i + γ−i ∆x−t−i
)
+
q∑
i=1
δi ∆yt−i + εt, (9)
where the Heaviside indicator variable It is defined by
It :=
1 uˆt−1 ≥ τ0 uˆt−1 < τ (10)
using the threshold parameter τ . Enders and Siklos (2001) suggest to follow Chan
(1993) and select the threshold τ by minimizing the sum of squared errors of the re-
gression to obtain a superconsistent estimator for τ . In practice, this is achieved by
estimating many regressions with fixed τ , where τ runs through all values of uˆt. We
apply a 15% lateral trimming to avoid τ ∗ becoming too close to the boundary and hence
ensuring a sufficient number of observations in each regime. Consequently, the AECM
can be interpreted as a special case of TECM with fixed threshold value τ = 0.
The statistical properties of asymmetry tests in residual-based threshold cointegra-
tion models are discussed in Schild and Schweikert (2017). While we could in principle
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test for short-run asymmetry using standard F -tests4, we have to employ bootstrap
tests for long-run asymmetry to accommodate the fact that we use cointegration resid-
uals as proxies for the deviations from long-run equilibrium. A bootstrap algorithm for
all symmetry tests in the AECM is given as follows:
(1) Estimate the long-run equilibrium equation to obtain βˆ0, βˆ1 and the cointegra-
tion residuals uˆt. Estimate the AECM and conduct the short-run and long-run
asymmetry tests, i.e. compute FLR, FSR, FCE, FFA+ and FFA− .
(2) Estimate the auxilliary ADF regression model in (2) to obtain %ˆ, γˆ1, . . . , γˆp and
save the residuals εˆt.
(3) Draw randomly from the residuals εˆt to obtain a bootstrap sample εbt .
(4) Generate the bootstrap cointegration residuals series as ∆ubt = %ˆubt−1 +∑k
j=1 γˆj ∆ubt−j + εbt and use (ub1, . . . , ubp) = (uˆ1, . . . , uˆp) as initial observations.
(5) Generate the bootstrap variable ybt = βˆ0 + βˆ1xt + ubt .
(6) Estimate the long-run equilibrium equation for ybt and xt and re-estimate the
AECM to compute the bootstrap F -statistics, F bLR, F bSR, F bCE, F bFA+ and F bFA− .
(7) Repeat (2) to (6) sufficiently often to obtain the empirical distributions of the
bootstrap F -statistics. Compute the p-values for FLR, FSR, FCE, FFA+ and FFA−
based on the bootstrap distribution.
The algorithm can easily be adapted for the TECM using an optimizing threshold
value.
5 Empirical Analysis
We start our analysis by testing all price series for their order of integration. For this
matter, we apply Dickey-Fuller and KPSS tests to the prices and to the returns. If each
series is determined to be integrated of order one, we proceed with our cointegration
analysis and estimate the error correction models.
4Bootstrap tests and standard F -tests for short-run asymmetry lead to the same test decision in
our empirical application.
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5.1 Data, unit root and cointegration tests
The transmission of crude oil price changes to pre-tax retail gasoline and diesel prices
is analyzed using daily data from August 2004 to March 2016. Since crude oil is not
traded on weekends, we delete the fuel price observations for weekends to obtain a
matching sample. Austrian retail gasoline and diesel prices, expressed in Euro per 1000
litres, are obtained from two sources. Prices from August 2004 to December 2011 are
collected by the ÖAMTC as part of voluntary disclosures by retailers.5 The prices from
January 2012 to March 2016 are obtained from the E-Control database. Following the
law on transparency of prices, retailers were required to submit their prices beginning in
July 2011. The European benchmark price for crude oil is Brent which is obtained from
Thomson Reuters Datastream. Their source is the Energy Information Administration
(EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy. The price is reported in US Dollars per
barrel. Therefore, the Brent crude oil price is converted to Euro per 1000 litres using the
USD/EUR exchange rate and the corresponding conversion rate to ensure an ordinary
comparison of the prices. Retail gasoline and diesel prices without tax and duty are
used to exclude the possibility that the taxation structure affects our results.
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Figure 1: Fuel prices in Euro/1000l. The vertical dashed lines mark the timing of the first
and second fuel price regulation in Austria.
5On an average day in the period 2004-2008, approximately 61% of all retailers submit their prices
which allows for a good approximation of Austrian retail fuel prices (BWB 2008). However, since the
average prices are computed based on voluntarily submitted prices by retailers, we have to approach
the quality of our data from 2004 to 2011 with some skepticism.
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The model specification is based on raw price levels instead of log prices following
the study of Meyler (2009) in which the author argues that the long-run relationship
between price levels is relatively stable while the relationship between log prices fluc-
tuates substantially over a long sample. We estimate our models for a pre-regulation
period, a between-regulations and a post-regulation period to investigate whether the
characteristics of the price transmission process have changed after the implementation
of two fuel price regulations. The first sample period (pre-regulation) runs from August
2004 to June 2009, the second subsample (between-regulations) spans from July 2009
to December 2010 and the last subsample (post-regulation) spans from January 2011
to March 2016.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Brent price series and the Austrian retail gasoline
and diesel prices for the full sample period. It is visible that the trajectories move
closely together. Moreover, extreme fluctuations can be observed during the Financial
Crisis. Pre-tax and duty retail diesel prices are on average higher than gasoline prices.
Nonetheless, we observe prices at the pump in Austria which are higher for gasoline
than diesel prices. This can be explained by a higher mineral oil tax for gasoline than
for diesel (48.2 vs. 39.7 cents per litre in 2016).
Table 1: Unit root tests for crude oil and fuel prices
ADF KPSS
drift lags trend lags drift lags trend lags
pc −1.826 5 −1.324 5 8.836∗∗∗ 9 2.897∗∗∗ 9
pg −2.313 10 −2.086 10 10.140∗∗∗ 9 2.379∗∗∗ 9
pd −1.971 10 −1.517 10 8.015∗∗∗ 9 2.455∗∗∗ 9
∆pc −21.433∗∗∗ 4 - - 0.296 9 - -
∆pg −13.280∗∗∗ 9 - - 0.220 9 - -
∆pd −13.638∗∗∗ 9 - - 0.374∗ 9 - -
Note: pc denotes the daily crude oil price, while pg and pd denote the daily gasoline and diesel price, respectively.
Including an intercept in the ADF/KPSS test equation is indicated with drift, including an additional linear trend term
with trend. The lag selection for the ADF test was achieved via Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Since it is highly
unrealistic that first differences of prices series follow a linear trend, we do not conduct the unit root test using the trend
specification for the first differences.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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For the empirical analysis, we first test the price series for their order of integration.
For this purpose, we employ the ADF test as well as a KPSS test. The null hypothesis
of the ADF test is nonstationarity in form of a unit root while the alternative hypothesis
is (trend-)stationarity. The optimal lag length selection is achieved by using the AIC.
As shown in Table 1 all values for the ADF t-statistic are above the critical 5% value.
This means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. In contrast, the null hypothesis
is rejected for the first differenced series. The KPSS test assumes (trend-)stationarity
under the null hypothesis and nonstationarity under the alternative. Here, we reject
the stationarity hypothesis at the 5% significance level and cannot reject the null for
the first differenced series. This is the case for all variables in all sample periods.
Hence, the variables are assumed to be integrated of order one and we can continue our
cointegration analysis.
Table 2: Long-run equilibria and cointegration tests
Sample: 08/04 - 06/09 07/09 - 12/10 01/11 - 03/16
Obs. 1263 393 1367
pg pd pg pd pg pd
β0 167.47 172.06 134.80 103.06 248.94 228.57
β1 1.01 1.17 1.10 1.25 0.856 0.996
EG −3.698∗∗ −3.348∗∗ −3.887∗∗ −3.524∗∗ −3.427∗∗ −4.428∗∗∗
ΦTAR 11.07∗∗∗ 8.233∗∗∗ 17.36∗∗∗ 17.70∗∗∗ 9.679∗∗∗ 22.90∗∗∗
Note: EG denotes the Engle-Granger cointegration test. Critical values for the EG test are 10%: −3.044, 5%: −3.336,
1%: −3.896. ΦTAR denotes the Enders-Siklos test with TAR adjustment. Critical values for the Enders-Siklos test are:
10%: 4.88, 5%: 5.79, 1%: 7.81.
Given that our variables are all integrated of order one, we can use the Engle-Granger
two step approach to test for cointegration. As the first step, we estimate the long-
run equilibrium relationship based on the linear model (1) to obtain the cointegrating
vector. In this study, we treat crude oil prices (pc) as an exogenous variable and use
either gasoline prices (pg) or diesel prices (pd) as the dependent variable. The Brent
crude oil market is considerably larger than the Austrian retail fuel market so that price
shocks coming from an unelastic local fuel demand should not influence the Brent price
significantly. This assumption is supported by results from additional error correction
models for Brent adjustment which are not reported. The second step of the Engle-
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Granger approach involves conducting a unit root test on the least squared residual
series to ascertain whether uˆt indeed constitutes a stationary equilibrium error. For
this purpose, we apply the EG test based on an ADF regression where the AIC is
used to select the lag truncation parameter. Since the EG test does not account for
the possibility of asymmetric adjustment, we also apply the Enders-Siklos threshold
cointegration test (ΦTAR). The results are reported in Table 2. We observe that the
null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in all cases. We can therefore analyze the
particular retail fuel adjustment in response to input price shocks.
5.2 Results
According to the Federal Minister of Science, Research and Economy of Austria, the
aim of the fuel price regulation in 2011 was to improve competitive conditions for
retailers and provide price transparency for consumers (BMDW, 2010). Hence, the
policy measure should positively influence the competitive structure of the Austrian
fuel market and reduce the search costs of consumers through increased transparency.
If the Austrian fuel market was indeed uncompetitive before the price regulation, we
should find evidence of asymmetric price transmission in the first subsample. The price
regulation should then lead to faster responses in case of falling crude oil prices. We
would expect generally faster adjustment rates and less evidence for APT in the second
and third subsamples. However, if the retail fuel prices are distorted because retailers
anticipate that they cannot raise their prices after noon and charge generally higher
prices, this could lead to positive APT in the post-regulation period.
Hence, in order to evaluate the fuel price regulations we first estimate an asymmetric
error correction model according to (3) and a threshold error correction model according
to (9) for the pre-regulation subsample. The main results are reported in Table 3 and
additional estimates are presented in Table 4.
5.2.1 Pre-regulation subsample
Before the introduction of the first regulation, we find some evidence of positive long-run
asymmetry for gasoline, but do not reject the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment
for diesel. In contrast to the finding of positive long-run asymmetry, the short-run
coefficient estimates reveal that crude oil price decreases are passed through faster than
crude oil price increases in the gasoline market. While the gasoline price needs two days
to react to crude oil price increases, it responds to decreases on the first day. Further,
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we observe that crude oil price increases are not completely passed through. Although
the diesel price reacts symmetrically to crude oil price changes, it does not completely
pass through crude oil price changes (see Table 4). Overall, the diesel adjustment to
short-run changes in crude oil appears to be sluggish. We obtain very similar results if
the optimal threshold value is estimated from the data (see the TECM results in panel
(d) of Table 3).
To better understand the complete dynamics of the adjustment process and to
evaluate whether short-run or long-run asymmetries dominate the adjustment process,
we also investigate the impulse-response curves of the retail prices. For this matter, we
consider a combined long-run and short-run impulse. We model an exogenous input
price increase by one cent which also leads to a negative deviation from the long-run
equilibrium by one cent leaving the retail fuel price fixed. Since the input price is
assumed to be exogenous, the retail fuel price has to react to maintain the long-run
equilibrium. Similarly, an input price decrease leads to a positive deviation from the
long-run equilibrium. The pass through computations reported in panel (b) and panel
(c) of Table 3 are based on the AECM specification.
The pass through of input price shocks is relatively slow for both retail markets in
the first subsample. In case of gasoline, the pass through of crude oil price decreases is
slower (by six days) than the pass through of increases. Diesel passes through crude oil
price decreases slightly faster (by two days) than decreases. In contrast to our results,
the first BWB study reports faster adjustment of diesel prices. This might, however, be
attributed to the different impulse specifications. It also appears difficult to compare
our results against those obtained by other studies on the Austrian fuel market using
different model specifications. The results of Meyler (2009) are based on weekly data
and can therefore hardly be used as a comparison since the minimal speed of adjustment
is one week per construction. Arpa et al. (2006) use a log-specification which makes it
difficult to compare the speed of adjustment.
In summary, we can only link some empirical evidence of positive long-run asymmet-
ric adjustment in the Austrian retail gasoline market to the public debate on potential
asymmetric fuel price transmission prior to the first fuel price regulation. The cor-
responding price adjustment in the diesel market seems to be symmetric during this
period. Our results on the pre-regulation period are largely in line with the first study
of the BWB where Rotterdam fuel spot prices were used instead of crude oil prices.
They do not find significant evidence for long-run asymmetry in both retail markets
but report substantial short-run asymmetries in the gasoline market (BWB 2008).
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Table 3: Results of the error correction models
Sample: 08/04 - 06/09 07/09 - 12/10 01/11 - 03/16
Obs. 1263 393 1367
pg pd pg pd pg pd
Panel (a): AECM
α+ −0.010 −0.044 −0.030 −0.185 −0.010 −0.002
α− −0.056 −0.029 −0.156 −0.013 −0.048 −0.067
FLR 4.743∗∗ 0.780 3.373∗ 5.704∗∗ 4.914∗∗ 6.575∗∗
FSR 2.678∗∗ 0.893 5.971∗∗∗ 5.105∗∗∗ 10.41∗∗∗ 10.27∗∗∗
FCE 6.425∗∗ 0.237 0.884 4.733∗∗ 2.316∗ 2.399∗
FFA+ 11.65∗∗∗ 9.552∗∗∗ 3.998∗∗ 1.444 28.00∗∗∗ 14.56∗∗∗
FFA− 0.091 10.51∗∗∗ 0.774 2.449 11.91∗∗∗ 4.278∗∗
Panel (b): 50% pass through of input price increases reached
tdays 12 16 4 2 8 5
Panel (c): 50% pass through of input price decreases reached
tdays 18 14 4 3 6 4
Panel (d): TECM
τˆ 23.94 −28.02 −17.44 15.04 −25.18 16.44
α1 −0.011 −0.053 −0.065 −0.205 −0.013 0.004
α2 −0.047 −0.019 −0.149 −0.029 −0.051 −0.065
FLR 3.508 4.745 2.130 7.031∗∗ 5.725∗ 9.310∗∗∗
FSR 2.448∗ 1.105 5.834∗∗∗ 8.196∗∗∗ 10.19∗∗∗ 10.22∗∗∗
FCE 5.374∗∗∗ 1.133 0.063 5.336∗∗ 1.559∗ 1.759∗
FFA+ 10.45∗∗∗ 10.51∗∗∗ 3.038 3.064∗ 28.60∗∗∗ 14.47∗∗∗
FFA− 0.521 15.75∗∗∗ 2.238 0.682 16.54∗∗∗ 6.401∗∗
Note: FLR denotes the F -statistic computed for the null hypothesis of symmetric long-run adjustment, H01 : α+ = α−.
FSR denotes the F -statistic computed for the null hypothesis of symmetric short-run effects, H02 : γ+1 = γ
−
1 ∧· · ·∧γ+p =
γ−p . FCE denotes the F -statistic computed for the null hypothesis of symmetric cumulated effect, H03 : γ+0 + · · ·+γ+p =
γ−0 + · · · + γ−p . FFA+ and FFA− denote the F -statistics computed for the null hypothesis, H04a : γ+0 + · · · + γ+p = 1
and H04b : γ−0 + · · ·+ γ−p = 1, respectively.∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
5.2.2 Between-regulation subsample
After the introduction of the first price regulation, we find very different adjustment
characteristics compared to the first subsample. Deviations from the long-run equilib-
rium seem to be adjusted with greater asymmetry in the gasoline market if we consider
the numerical value of the coefficients (see panel (a) of Table 3). However, the differ-
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ence between the adjustment coefficients of the AECM is only significant at the 10%
level. This provides only slight evidence for positive APT in the gasoline market. Also,
we find some evidence for asymmetric short-run effects. A closer look at the short-run
adjustment estimates reveals that retail prices respond faster to input price decreases
than input price increases at the first lag (see Table 4). If the input price changes date
back longer, increases are adjusted faster than decreases. The difference of the cumula-
tive effects is insignificant which means that the differences at specific lags average out
over the full adjustment process.
The diesel price seems to respond faster to positive deviations from the long-run
equilibrium in the between-regulation subsample. We find significant evidence for neg-
ative APT in the AECM and the TECM. The short-run transmission of crude oil price
changes is asymmetric and the difference of cumulative effects is significant. The diesel
price seems to react to transitory input price changes with a similar pattern as the
gasoline price. We observe a faster response to crude oil price decreases than to price
increases at the first lag but a more rapid pass through of price increases at the re-
maining lags. In total, the faster response to price increases dominates the cumulative
response time which leads to a rejection of H03. The speed of pass through after the
first price regulation is now considerably faster for both retail markets and appears to
be largely symmetric. Gasoline passes through 50% of a crude oil price shock in four
days while diesel needs two to three days.
In summary, the results of the first regulation indicate slight evidence for positive
long-run APT in case of gasoline and negative long-run APT in case of diesel as well as
asymmetries in the short-run. Remarkably, the speed of pass through from input prices
to output prices seems to increase for both retail markets after the implementation of
fuel price regulations. However, the results of the between-regulations subsample have
to be interpreted cautiously since the sample size is relatively small.
5.2.3 Post-regulation subsample
The longer post-regulation subsample surprisingly reveals significant positive long-run
asymmetry for diesel. These results can be attributed to the non-adjustment of very
large positive deviations found in the TECM. Still, we observe a faster pass through of
transitory input price decreases and a general underreaction to crude oil price changes.
Long-run adjustment rates for gasoline are still significantly different and again we find
short-run asymmetry following the pattern of previous subsamples. Price decreases from
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the last period are passed through faster than price increases but the opposite holds if
the price changes date back more than two days. In the post-regulation period, both
crude oil price increases and decreases are not completely transmitted. The impulse-
response analysis for this subsample shows that the short-run effect dominates the
long-run effect as input price decreases are passed through slightly faster than input
price increases.
Following the implementation of both fuel price regulations, we find statistical evi-
dence for long-run asymmetry in the diesel market. While the numerical values of the
adjustment coefficients in the between-regulations subsample indicates negative APT,
we report positive APT in the longer post-regulation period. The long-run adjustment
of gasoline prices tends to indicate positive APT in all subsamples. However, we reveal
a similar asymmetric short-run response pattern in both retail markets. Both retail
fuel prices seem to show a substantial underreaction to input price changes after the
second price regulation. Considering the numerical estimates, it seems that retailers
are particularly cautious in the process of increasing their prices. This might be inter-
preted as a strategic response caused by the added competitive pressure from fixing the
price structure for the next 24 hours. Retailers are forced to position themselves com-
petitively in the market by choosing a maximum price for one day. Hence, they have
to pass through crude oil price decreases immediately while they delay crude oil price
increases. These adjustments are decomposed into smaller steps and are subsequently
passed through over the following days. Unfortunately, our methodology is not able to
account for confounding factors such as technological progress or further organizational
changes of the Austrian retail fuel market which might coincide with the implementa-
tion of fuel price regulations. However, we identify an immediate change of the speed
of pass through after the first Fuel Price Fixing Act which remains quite stable in the
longer post-regulation period.
6 Conclusion
Our findings in this study shed some light on the implications of price regulations in
the Austrian retail fuel market. Our results indicate that the decision to implement fuel
price regulations could have been motivated by previously existing asymmetric price
transmissions in the gasoline market, but we do not find any statistical evidence for
positive APT in the diesel market. Public concerns about possibly collusive behaviour
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of the Austrian retail fuel industry were noted before the first Fuel Price Fixing Act was
implemented and the policy measure was expected to improve competitive conditions
for retailers and provide price transparency for consumers. Nevertheless, we still find
evidence for asymmetric adjustment after the revision of the Fuel Price Fixing Act in
2011. Retail fuel prices seem to adjust more slowly if crude oil prices are relatively
low. In contrast, we mostly find negative short-run APT which indicates competitive
pressure to delay input price increases. Only if we consider the combined effect of
input price shocks, we observe that the speed of pass through has generally become
faster for both retail fuel markets. Crude oil price decreases are now passed through
slightly faster than crude oil price increases. Overall, the Fuel Price Fixing Act can
be considered a partial success as it seems to have fostered competition between retail
filling stations and thereby increased consumer welfare. However, it remains difficult to
predict how fuel price regulations would affect other retail fuel markets as their market
structures are not identical to the Austrian retail fuel market. Future research might
consider the identification of causal effects of fuel price regulations which unfortunately
cannot be measured under the present research design and data availability.
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8 Appendix
Table 4: Additional estimates for the AECM
Sample: 08/04 - 06/09 07/09 - 12/10 01/11 - 03/16
Obs. 1263 393 1367
pg pd pg pd pg pd
α+ −0.010 −0.044 −0.030 −0.185 −0.010 −0.002
α− −0.056 −0.029 −0.156 −0.013 −0.048 −0.067
γ+0 0.264∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
γ+1 −0.083 0.014 −0.247∗∗ −0.124 −0.072 −0.044
γ+2 0.006 0.001 0.159 0.356∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
γ+3 0.114∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.174∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.066 0.095∗∗
γ+4 0.105∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.111 0.328∗∗∗ 0.059 0.077∗
γ+5 0.144∗∗ 0.095 0.005 - 0.063 0.099∗∗
γ−0 0.363∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.101 0.082 0.086∗ 0.110∗∗
γ−1 0.152∗∗∗ 0.013 0.536∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
γ−2 0.101∗∗ 0.062 −0.110 −0.048 0.013 0.034
γ−3 0.066 0.004 0.047 0.025 0.071 0.081∗
γ−4 0.044 0.026 0.176∗ 0.018 0.106∗∗ 0.108∗∗
γ−5 0.237∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.025 - 0.040 0.027
δ1 −0.407∗∗∗ −0.424∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.279∗∗∗
δ2 −0.197∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗
δ3 −0.009 −0.049 −0.138∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.022
δ4 −0.091∗∗∗ −0.021 −0.084 −0.140∗∗ 0.025 −0.020
δ5 0.132∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
Note: Results of individual significance tests for the long-run adjustment coefficients are not indicated, since their
significance is evaluated using an F -test (see Table 3). The number of lags is based on the AIC and on tests for residual
autocorrelation.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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